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CATCHING-UP AND CREDIT BOOMS IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN EU MEMBER STATES 
AND ACCEDING COUNTRIES: AN 
INTERPRETATION WITHIN THE NEW 




Credit to the private sector has risen rapidly in many Central and Eastern European EU 
Member States (MS) and acceding countries (AC) in recent years. The lending boom has 
recently been particularly strong in the segment of loans to households, primarily mortgage-
based housing loans, and in those countries that operate currency boards or other forms of 
hard pegs. The main aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework to analyze the 
observed developments with a view to exploring some policy implications at a stage in which 
these countries are preparing for their prospective integration with the euro area. To achieve 
this, we first use a stylized New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) framework, which has recently 
been advanced by Goodfriend (2002) and Goodfriend and King (2000). We then discuss the 
implications of the NNS model for credit dynamics and ensuing monetary policy challenges. 
Specifically, we emphasize consumption smoothing as an important channel of the observed 
credit expansion and we show how it is related to and how it affects the monetary policy 
making in MS and AC. In doing so, we place our discussion in the context of the monetary 
integration process in general and the nominal convergence process in particular. 
JEL Code: E5, F3. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit to the private sector has risen rapidly in many Central and Eastern European EU 
Member  States  (MS)  and  acceding  countries  (AC)  in  recent  years.  Recently  the  lending  boom 
appears to be particularly strong in the segment of loans to households, primarily mortgage-based 
housing loans, and in those countries that operate currency boards or other forms of hard pegs. This 
development attracted considerable attention from policy makers and spurred new research aimed at 
better understanding the phenomenon. 
A  number  of  potential  explanations  of  credit  expansions  have  been  put  forward  in  the 
literature (for reviews of the literature see e.g. Terrones and Mendoza (2004), Gourinchas, Valdes 
and Landerretche (2001) or Backé and Zumer (2005)). For example, some authors emphasize the 
role of real business cycles caused by technological or terms-of-trade shocks. Others see financial 
liberalization  of  an  initially  repressed  financial  system  as  an  important  force  fueling  credit 
dynamics. Still others focus on the role of capital flows triggered by external factors or wealth 
shocks originating from comprehensive structural reforms. Also, less then fully credible polices, in 
particular exchange rate-based stabilizations, can play a role in stimulating credit booms by setting 
off a consumption boom. Finally, credit expansion can be viewed simply as a symptom of financial 
development, in particular financial deepening, as the literature on the finance-growth nexus points 
out (on this strand of the literature see e.g. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Rajan and Zingales 
(2001)). 
Indeed, when looking at the experience of the MS and AC countries over the last decade or 
so most of these factors have been at play, while their relative importance has changes over time.
1 
Lending growth in these countries has been promoted at different stages of their transition and 
catching-up  process  by  a  set  of  factors.  Undoubtedly,  credit  expansion  was  stimulated  by 
                                                 
1 Studies on credit growth in MS and AC have mushroomed in the last few years. See Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and 
Vladkova-Hollar (2003), Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák (2006), Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk (2006), Hilbers et al.   3 
macroeconomic stabilization and a build-up of confidence in policy frameworks that provided lower 
inflation and, thus, declining interest rates. Privatization and restructuring of the banking sector 
together with regulatory reforms of financial markets have promoted private savings as a source of 
banks’  financing  the  credit  expansion.  At  the  same  time  increased  competition  stimulated 
development of new products, such as for example mortgage loans. Continuous opening-up of these 
economies to international financial flows facilitated access to foreign funds as an additional source 
of refinancing banks’ credit action. Also improvements of legal frameworks, by reducing risk of 
banks’ activities, positively influenced supply of credit. Other government policies, such as interest 
rate subsidies or guarantee schemes, may have also contributed at times to lending booms. 
While all these factors have certainly had a bearing on the credit development in MS and 
AC, the particularly strong surge in household loans in the recent years suggests that households in 
these countries has recently started to engage more intensively in consumption smoothing, i. e. 
borrowing  against  their  expected  future  income.  Looking  ahead,  it  seems  likely  that  continued 
development  of  the  banking  sector  and  financial  markets  in  general  along  with  the  ongoing 
improvements  of  regulatory  and  legal  frameworks  will,  by  reducing  liquidity  and  collateral 
constraints on MS and AC households, further support credit dynamics in this segment. While, the 
households’ intertemporal substitution has been already suggested by some authors as potential 
driving force of credit expansion (see for example Coricelli, Mucci and Revoltella (2006)), there as 
been so far little attempt to expose this issue in the context of MS and AC in their run-up to the euro 
area in a more systematic manner.  
The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  address  this  issue  and  to  propose  a  conceptual 
framework to analyze the observed developments with a view to exploring some policy implications 
at a stage in which these countries are preparing for their prospective integration with the euro area. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2005), Hilbers, Otker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2006), Duenwald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005), Backé, Égert and 
Zumer (2006).   4 
To achieve this, we first use a stylized New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) framework, which has 
been  advanced  by  Goodfriend  (2002)  and  Goodfriend  and  King  (2001).  We  then  discuss  the 
implications  of  the  NNS  model  for  credit  dynamics  and  ensuing  monetary  policy  challenges. 
Specifically, we emphasize consumption smoothing as an important channel of the observed credit 
expansion and we show how it is related to and how it affects the monetary policy making in MS 
and AC. In doing so, we place our discussion in the context of the monetary integration process in 
general and the nominal convergence process in particular. Against this background, we address 
some pertinent policy questions regarding the effects of the credit expansion on macroeconomic 
policies and financial stability.    
The outline of the reminder of the paper is as follows. The next section sets the scene by 
presenting the main stylized facts on credit growth in new MS and AC. Section 3 sketches the main 
features of the NNS framework. Section 4 presents the main insights from the NNS model for credit 
booms in new MS and AC in their run-up to the euro area. Section 5 contains our discussion of 
policy implications for MS and AC. Section 6 concludes and suggests avenues for further research.
   
2. Stylized facts 
The key facts about the developments in credit to the private sector in the new MS and in the 
AC, which will be analyzed in more detail in subsequent sections, can be summarized in three main 
points. First, in most countries one can observe dynamic growth in credit to the private sector, well 
above the pace seen in the euro area (see charts 1a and 1b). Nominal growth rates of credit to the 
private sector (displayed in chart 1a) have been especially high in the Baltic countries, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania, and to a somewhat lesser extent also in Slovenia. It is noteworthy that the 
Baltic countries and Bulgaria recorded very high nominal credit growth rates in an environment of 
low or relatively low inflation, while in Hungary, Slovenia and Romania credit dynamics have to be 
seen to some extent in the context of higher and only gradually falling inflation, implying less rapid   5 
growth rates of credit in real terms (see chart 1b). In some other countries growth in credit to the 
private sector has picked up recently (Czech Republic and Slovakia). In Poland, on the other hand, 
overall growth in credit to the private sector has moderated in recent years from relatively high 
levels  recorded  previously.  Although  growth  in  credit  to  the  private  sector  has  varied  across 
countries, lending to households, especially for home purchases, has been dynamic in all new MS as 
well as in the two AC. 
Chart 1a:   Credit Growth to the Private Sector, 1999–2005, Average annual changes in nominal 
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Note: The contraction in 2001 and 2002 in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia is essentially due to 
bank rehabilitation measures. 
Source: National central banks. 
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Chart 1b:   Credit Growth to the Private Sector, 1999–2005, Average annual changes in real 
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Note: The contraction in 2001 and 2002 in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia is essentially due to 
bank rehabilitation measures. 
Source: National central banks. 
Second, credit/GDP ratios have increased (or are beginning to increase) in most new MS and 
in  the  AC,  while  still  remaining  well  below  those  of  the  euro  area  (chart  2).  The  rise  was 
particularly pronounced in the Baltic countries and in Bulgaria. In Central Europe, the expansion of 
credit relative to GDP was noticeable in Hungary and Slovenia, while much more moderate in the 
Czech Republic and in Poland. Slovakia, in turn, has recorded broadly steady credit/GDP ratios, 
though starting from levels that were above those of the other countries under review. 
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Source: National central banks. 
Third, credit  expansion in the most of the new MS and AC has been  financed by  both 
domestic and foreign sources (see chart 3). While deposits of domestic residents played the main 
role in funding credit growth until 2001/02 and are still the largest item on the liability side of 
banks, foreign borrowing has become an increasingly important source of financing the expansion 
of domestic credit in these countries, particularly in those new MS/AC which have recorded rapid 
credit dynamics.  Whereas the banking systems of most new MS/AC were net lenders to the rest of 
the world at the beginning of this decade, the net foreign position of banks in those countries that 
have  recorded  high  and  rising  credit  growth  has  deteriorated  noticeably  more  recently  (as  net 
foreign liabilities increased or net foreign assets turned into net foreign liabilities). Still, net foreign   8 
liability positions of CEE banking sectors continue to be moderate; only in Estonia and Latvia have 
they reached more sizeable levels (of about 22% and 30% of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2005), 
in part driven by borrowing from foreign parent banks. In Poland and the Czech Republic, where 
aggregate credit growth has remained moderate, banking systems continue to be net creditors to the 
rest of the world. 
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Source: National central banks.   9 
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Moving now on to a more detailed stocktaking, it is useful to examine developments across 
countries, sectoral allocation and currency structure of credit to the private sector in the countries 
under review. 
Since 1999, credit growth has been most dynamic in the Baltic countries, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Whereas Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia displayed relatively steady annual 
average rates of credit expansion throughout the sample period, credit growth accelerated visibly in 
Latvia (until 2001 and again in 2005), Lithuania (until 2004), Bulgaria (in 2001 03) and Romania 
(until  2003),  i.e.  in  the countries  where  credit  growth  started  from  the  lowest  base (relative  to 
GDP),. It is notable that most recently, in 2005, credit growth decelerated in Bulgaria and Romania, 
while still being buoyant. The annual average growth rates of credit to the private sector differ 
substantially within these seven countries, ranging – in 2005 – from around 17% in Hungary to 
about 54% in Latvia.   10 
In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, growth in credit to the private sector picked up more 
recently  after  a  period  of  rather  moderate  or,  at  times,  negative  growth  before  2004  (Czech 
Republic) and 2002 (Slovakia). In 2005, credit growth in these two countries amounted to around 
10%, while accelerating further to around 15%, respectively, in 2005. It should be noted that in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia the interpretation of credit data before 2002 is difficult due to the 
consolidation of the banking sector and the cleaning of the credit portfolios of selected banks at the 
time. In any case, banking sector “rehabilitation” facilitated the subsequent acceleration of banks’ 
lending  activity  in  these  countries  since  2002.  In  addition,  the  fact  that  more  dynamic  credit 
expansion took place only recently can be attributed to the cautiousness of banks to finance longer-
term capital projects in the business sector and, in the Czech Republic, also to relatively moderate 
real GDP growth in past years. Moreover, FDI (which also includes credit transactions between 
affiliated enterprises) has been a particularly important source of financing in these two countries 
and has thus substituted for bank credit. 
In Poland, lending to the private sector has decelerated from relatively high rates recorded in 
the period up to the end of 2000, to average annual growth rates of around 5% since 2002. This was 
related to the economic slowdown and, in particular, the severe contraction of gross fixed capital 
formation during the earlier years of this decade. In the more recent economic upswing since 2003, 
the  ample  profit  situation  of  the  enterprise  sector  has  promoted  internal  financing  of  corporate 
sector activities and thus curbed overall credit demand in the economy. Household borrowing in 
contrast expanded dynamically. 
With  regard  to  sectoral  allocation,  the  trend  of  strong  growth  of  loans  to  households, 
primarily mortgage-based housing loans, in general continued in most of the countries throughout 
the period 1999 to 2005. However, housing loan dynamics have recently started to decelerate in a 
few countries, reflecting the tightening of mortgage scheme subsidies (Hungary) and base effects 
after  prior  spikes  in  lending  (e.g.  in  Latvia).  In  Slovakia,  on  the  contrary,  commercial  banks   11 
adjusted their interest rate policies to offset lower subsidies, which led to a further strengthening of 
mortgage loans dynamics. In Slovenia, where the credit expansion to the private sector was not 
strongly based on housing loans, such loans have also begun to pick up considerably more recently. 
Furthermore,  in  some  countries,  consumer  loans  have  also  grown  dynamically,  underpinning 
buoyant private consumption. 
Overall, loans to non-financial corporations have grown at a more measured pace than loans 
to  households,  so  that  the  share  of  household  lending  in  total  domestic  lending  increased 
considerably in most countries during the period under review (see chart 4).   
















Note: The horizontal line refers to the share of household loans in the euro area.  
Source: National central banks. 
In  terms  of  the  currency  structure  of  lending  to  the  private  sector,  foreign  currency-
denominated or foreign currency-indexed loans have had an important share in total private sector   12 
loans in most of the Central and Eastern European new Member States, with their shares ranging in 
2005 from 10% in the Czech Republic to 80% in Estonia (see chart 5). It is worth noting that in 
three of these countries, namely in the Baltic countries, the share of foreign currency-denominated 
loans is at or above 60% of total loans to the private sector. Furthermore, the shares in these three 
countries  have  remained  relatively  steady  between  1999  and  2005,  which  implies  that  foreign 
currency-denominated borrowing had already built up in the Baltics before 1999. Long-standing 
exchange rate stability and a high degree of foreign ownership in the banking sector may have 
played a role in these developments. The share of foreign currency-denominated loans is also high 
and  fairly  steady  in  the  two  acceding  countries  (around  50%).  In  the  other  countries,  with  the 
exception of the Czech Republic, the share of foreign currency-denominated borrowing increased 
over the same period, most notably in Slovenia and in Slovakia, where it tripled or almost doubled, 
respectively.   
Chart 5:   Share of Foreign Currency Loans in Total Loans to the Private Sector,  
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Source: National central banks.   13 
Foreign currency-denominated loans in new MS/AC are mainly granted to the non-financial 
corporate sector, and in some countries, in considerable magnitudes also to households. Such loans 
are mostly euro-denominated. In most countries under review, the euro and its legacy currencies 
have played a leading role in foreign currency lending from the outset. In the remaining countries, 
where the US dollar was preeminent, the euro has gained ground, to different degrees, with the 
reorientation of exchange rate policy to the single currency. However, in some countries, other 
currencies,  in  particular  the  Swiss  franc,  have  begun  to  gain  importance  most  recently,  also  in 
household borrowing. Foreign currency loans to non-financial corporations represent an important 
share in total loans outstanding to this sector in all EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
ranging, at the end of 2005, from around 16% in the Czech Republic to 83% in Estonia, whereas for 
the  household  sector  the  respective  shares  range  from  0.3%  in  the  Czech  Republic  to  75%  in 
Estonia. 
Overall,  borrowing  in  foreign  currency  has  been  more  extensive  in  countries with  fixed 
exchange rate regimes, particularly currency board arrangements, as the perceived exchange rate 
risk  is  smaller.  In  addition,  in  most  of  the  countries  borrowing  in  foreign  currency  has  been 
associated  with  lower  borrowing  costs  and  supported  by  progressing  financial  liberalization. 
Besides that, a sizeable share of borrowing in foreign currency is generally undertaken by larger 
multinational firms, for which information asymmetries are lower. Furthermore, foreign-currency 
borrowing by the corporate sector is frequently used for hedging purposes. Large multinational 
firms play a prominent role in this respect as well, as the greater part of their revenues is in foreign 
currency. On the contrary, the rationale for household borrowing in foreign currency is much less 
clear cut, even where and as long as sizeable interest rate differentials to key currencies still prevail, 
as it substantially increases their exposure to exchange rate risk, especially for loans denominated in 
other foreign currencies than the euro. 
   14 
3. A Sketch of the New Neoclassical Synthesis Model
2 
In this section we present a stylized, benchmark NNS model. In the next section we will 
discuss the main insights of the model for credit booms in MS and AC in their run-up to the euro 
area. The model incorporates classical features, such as a real business cycle (RBC) component, and 
Keynesian features, such as monopolistically competitive firms with sticky prices. In particular, as 
Goodfriend (2002) demonstrates, the NNS model behaves like the flexible price RBC model on 
average, but with some possibility for deviations of actual output from potential output in the short 
run,  and  thus  some  room  for  monetary  policy  to  influence  aggregate  demand  and  stabilize 
employment and inflation. Since the basic structure of this class of models is by now well known, 
we focus on certain key relationships which are relevant to the key objectives of our paper, leaving 
a complete account of the model to the appendix. 
 
3.1. Flexible prices: The RBC model 
The model is set up for a single country, i, and the representative household maximizes 
consumption subject to a standard budget constraint. With a log utility consumption function, the 
households´ utility from lifetime consumption is maximized, when the marginal rate of substitution 
is equal to the marginal rate of transformation: 








+ = + r ,                    1) 
where c1 and c2 represent the marginal utility from consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively, r is 
the real interest rate and  i r  is the subjective discount or time-preference factor (see the appendix 
for a full discussion). 
The household allocates time between leisure and work and the household gets direct utility 
from leisure and indirectly from earning a wage and using the wage to buy consumption goods
3. 
                                                 
2 See Goodfriend (2002).   15 
Assuming  log  utility  functions  for  leisure  and  consumption  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  the 





n - =1 ,                      2) 
where n
s denotes labor supply and w is the real wage. 
In each country there are assumed to be a large number of monopolistically competitive 
firms so that each firm can sustain a price above the marginal cost of production. Firms adjust their 
prices to maintain the profit maximizing markup of price over marginal cost, * m , at all times and 
the profit maximizing markup is invariant to shifts in demand or in the cost of production. With a 
Cobb Douglas production technology it can be demonstrated that the first order condition for the 





= m ,                      3) 
where (1/a) is the hours of work needed to produce one unit of consumption, w is the real wage 
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Furthermore, the equilibrium employment, n*, and the equilibrium output, c*, in each country can 













= a ci ,                    6) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 The hourly wage buys w units of consumption and the household values the additional w units of consumption at 
u’(c)=1/c. So, the household ears w/c units of utility by working an hour instead of taking leisure.    16 
Thus, the equilibrium employment n*, in the flexible price RBC model depends only on the profit 
maximizing markup 
* m  and does not fluctuate with productivity, a
4, whereas output, c*, grows and 
fluctuates  proportionally  with  productivity  a.  By  substituting  the  current  and  future  supply  of 
consumption goods ( * 1 c * 2 c ) into the optimal lifetime consumption plan 1) an expression for the 




























+ = + .              7) 
From expression 7) we see that the equilibrium real interest rate varies directly with the growth of 
labor productivity, as in standard neoclassical growth theory models. The driving force for this is 
the existence of the life time consumption plan and the consumption smoothing of a representative 
agent. For example, when future productivity is expected to be higher than current productivity 
) ( 2 1 a a < , households will want to borrow against their brighter future income prospects to bring 
some consumption forward in time. As they engage in consumption smoothing, households drive up 
the real interest rate to the point where they are satisfied with the steeply sloped consumption plan 
that matches the expected growth of productivity. Hence, the real equilibrium interest rate clears the 
economy-wide goods market by inducing the representative household to spend exactly the amount 
of  its  current  income;  demand  matches  supply  and  the  economy  is  in  equilibrium  with  stable 
inflation.  
 
3.2. Introducing sticky prices: The NNS model 
  Relaxing  the  assumption  that  firms  constantly  adjust  prices  to  maintain  the  profit 
maximizing markup allows aggregate demand to generate short-term fluctuations in employment 
                                                 
4 The reason is that productivity a affects consumption c and the real wage w proportionally given hours worked n.   17 
and output.  If prices are sticky in the short term, a firm decides to change the price of its product to 
restore the profit maximizing markup only when demand or cost conditions move the actual markup 
persistently away from the profit maximizing markup. If a firm expects the shock to the markup to 
be  temporary  it  will  not  change  its  price  to  restore  the  profit  maximizing  markup.  Given  this 
behavior, one can write the following inflation function: 
p m m p E E INF + = ) , ( 2 1                    8) 
where  p E  is the expected rate of inflation, and  ) , ( 2 1 m m E INF  is a function indicating the effect of 
the current and expected future markup on inflation. When the current and expected future markup 
equal the profit maximizing markup firms adjust their prices in accordance with expected inflation, 
so 0 ) , ( =
* * m m INF .    Markup  compression  ) (
* < m m   moves  actual  inflation  above  expected 
inflation whereas markup expansion  ) (
* > m m  moves actual inflation below expected inflation.  
Stickiness  of  prices  implies  that  current  employment  and  output  are  determined  by  the 
aggregate demand for goods. This outcome is central to the new neoclassical synthesis: although 
firms maintain the profit maximizing markup on average over time, so that the NNS model behaves 
like the flexible price RBC model on average, there is nonetheless some scope for monetary policy 
to influence aggregate demand and stabilize employment and inflation in the short-run, if prices are 
sticky.  
 
3.3. The central bank reaction function 
 The central bank reaction function in this class of NNS models typically presupposes that 
there are no constraints to using the nominal interest rate in monetary policy-making. Accordingly, 
the  central  bank’s  policy  actions  may  be  described  in  the  following  way.  The  central  bank 
implements monetary policy by steering the short-term nominal interest rate,  R . After making   18 
some simplifying assumptions about expected inflation rate
5 the central bank’s nominal interest rate 
target,  R ,  translates  into  a  certain  target  for  the  real  interest  rate,  r .  Furthermore,  the  public 
expects future markups to be at their profit maximizing level, 
*
2) ( m m = E , and current and future 
productivity  ) , ( 2 1 a a  are given by technology and independently of interest policy, so that from 6) 




= a c . Hence, using equation 1), one can write 














c                    9) 
Expression  9)  reveals  the  way  interest  rate  policy  influences  aggregate  demand:  current 
consumption  1 c   is  inversely  related  to  the  targeted  real  interest  rate,  r ,  when  expected  future 
consumption  is  anchored  at  * 2 1
1
m +
a .  An  increase  in  the  targeted  real  interest  rate  depresses 
current aggregate demand by raising the opportunity cost of current consumption in terms of future 
consumption.  The  contraction  in  aggregate  demand  is  reflected,  in  turn,  in  reduced  current 
employment,  1 n , a low current real wage,  1 w , and an expanded current markup  1 m . Conversely, a 
cut in the real interest rate target expands current aggregate demand, raises the real wage, and 
compresses the markup.  
 
3.4. An example of catching-up and the role of central bank  
In this section we consider an example of catching-up, in terms of an upward shift in trend 
productivity growth,
6 in the context of the NNS model and, in particular, consider the central banks 
reaction  to  this  shock.  With  such  a  shock,  current  and  future  productivity  are  related  by 
                                                 
5 See Goodfriend (2002) for more details.   19 
1 2 ) 1 ( a g a + =  , where  g  is the trend growth rate and current productivity, 1 a , is taken as given. 
Assuming  that  the  interest  rate  policy  is  expected  to  keep  the  actual  markup  at  the  profit 
maximizing markup in the future, 
* = m m2  , future income prospects will vary directly with the 





) 1 ( 1 2 a g y  .                  10) 
Using conditions A2) and A3) and setting  1 1 c y =  (current income is demand-determined when 
prices are sticky), we can solve for current aggregate consumption, 1 c , in terms of  future income 










.                    11) 
  By  substituting  2 y from  10)  into  11)  we  see  that  -  holding  r   constant  -  a  household 
transmits  higher  future  income  induced  by  an  increase  in  trend  productivity  growth  to  current 
consumption,  employment  and  output.  In  other  words,  households  smooth  consumption  by 
borrowing in the credit market as they allocate any expected increase in lifetime resources to both 
current and future consumption.  
From this example we see that a positive shock to trend productivity growth is inflationary: 
an increase in current aggregate demand raises the real wage and compresses the markup due to an 
increased demand for labor. However, the central bank can stabilize the economy by moving its real 
interest rate target proportionately with the growth rate,  g (and thus real equilibrium interest rate, 
* r ;  substitute  1 ) 1 ( a g +   for  2 a   in  7).  The  higher  real  interest  rate  target  gives  households  a 
disincentive  to  bring  consumption  of  expected  resources  forward.  In  other  words,  in  order  to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 Although it is possible to use the NNS to analyze a variety of shocks, in this paper we focus only on productivity 
shocks, as they are the most relevant for our purposes. For more details see Goodfriend (2002).   20 
stabilize the economy the central bank has to contain consumption smoothing by raising its real 
interest rate target, r .   This result will be central to our subsequent policy analysis.  
 
4. Insights from the NNS model for credit booms in new MS and AC in their run-up to the 
euro area 
In this section we present the main insights of the NNS model that we believe are relevant 
for the observed credit dynamics in MS and AC. In doing so, we first present the basic set-up. 
Having done so, we discuss some pertinent issues related to the link between the credit booms and 
the convergence process in the run-up to the euro area. 
 
4.1. The basic set-up 
The NNS model presented above is a one-country model. Therefore, in order to draw some 
implications of the model for MS and AC consider a simplified case where there are two economies 
operating along the lines of the NNS model
7. For practical purposes, think of the euro area as the 
one, economy i, and an MS/AC as the other, economy j. Furthermore, suppose that both economies 
are heterogeneous in terms of two specific aspects (that we observe in practice): i) differences in the 
trend  productivity  growth  rates  and  ii)  differences  in  economic  size.  Specifically,  think  of  the 
MS/AC as a relatively smaller and catching-up economy. In terms of the NNS modeling, catching-
up means that the trend productivity growth rate,  g , in the MS/AC, j, exceeds that of the euro area, 
i, so that  i j g g > .  
Now consider the case where economy j, decides to peg its currency to economy i. In this 
case, and assuming no capital controls, the rate of interest in country j is pinned down by the 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP): 
                                                 
7 Developing the NNS model into a two-country open economy model would allow making the point in a more rigorous 
manner and should be the subject of further research.      21 
t t t i j e E i i s + W D = - + ) ( 1                                              12)    
where  j i  is the nominal interest rate in MS/AC (henceforth also referred to as domestic interest 
rate) and  i i is the nominal interest rate in the euro area (henceforth also refereed to as foreign 
interest rate),  ) (× E is the expectation operator,  t W is the information available up to period t,  t e  is the 
log of the exchange rate and  t s  is the risk premium. In general, the UIP condition is a vehicle 
through which the monetary policy in country i is transmitted to country j: in absence of the risk 
premium
8, and if exchange rates are fixed for ever, i.e. ) ( 1 t t e E W D + = 0, domestic interest rates are 
equal to foreign interest rates.  
In this model, the euro area wide economy is stabilized as long as the euro area central 
bank’s nominal interest rate target,  i i i r i R = =  is consistent with keeping the targeted real interest 
rate,  i r , at the equilibrium level, 
*
i r
9. Furthermore, as long as trend growth rates were the same in 
economy i and in economy j (and as long as cyclical synchronization is high), UIP would not imply 
a deviation of interest rates in economy j from equilibrium interest rate levels. In this special case, 
therefore, monetary policy of country i would stabilize both economies. However, consider now a 
case, as we noted earlier, when the small economy, j, which has pegged its currency to that of 
economy i, starts to catch-up and households expect an increase of trend productivity growth rate, 
g , such that  i j g g > . In this case, economy j faces a higher equilibrium interest rate that that in the 
i economy,  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * + > + i j r r  and stabilization of the economy calls for raising the target rate,  j r , 
point for point with the increased  g , i.e. in proportion to the increase in the growth rate in order to 
set  the  real  interest  rate  with  the  equilibrium  rate  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( j j r r + = +
* .  However,  given  the  UIP 
                                                 
8 In that stage of our discussion we will disregard the risk component. We will return to this in the next subsection. 
9 Here we treat the euro area economy en bloc. Obviously, there is also heterogeneity among members of the euro area 
that creates its own challenges for stabilization policies in the euro area. This is a specific problem that has been address 
by various papers, for example in the context of inflation differentials in the euro area (see for example, MacDonald and 
Wójcik (2006).      22 
condition the actual rate is lower that the equilibrium rate that would be required to stabilize the 
economy, 
* < = J j r r r . This gives households an incentive to consume expected future resources, 
thus fueling lending in economy j. 
If  not  kept  in  check,  households  will  borrow  in  the  credit  market  in  order  to  smooth 
consumption which will eventually raise current aggregate demand over current output. An increase 
in current aggregate demand, if not offset by other policies (in particular fiscal policy), raises the 
real wage and compresses the markup due to an increased demand for labor. After a sustained mark-
up  compression  firms  would  decide  to  change  the  price  of  their  products  to  restore  the  profit 
maximizing markup which would eventually lead to added inflation pressures (see  eq. 8). The 
eventual price effect will depend on the degree of openness of the economy. With a high degree of 
openness, the price effect of the credit expansion maybe benign, while it may spill-over onto current 
account deficits or/and asset price inflation. We will return to this point in subsection 4.3 where we 
discuss the general consequences of credit expansions. 
 
4.2. Credit booms and the convergence process 
The  above  discussion  shows  how  the  constraint  on  monetary  policy  deriving  from  the 
exchange rate commitment can add extra momentum to lending dynamics in small, catching-up 
economies such as MS and AC. However, we have so far disregarded the risk premium in the UIP 
condition. In practice, the MS and AC assets need not be, and indeed typically are not, perfect 
substitutes with euro area assets: in terms of the UIP condition presented above this implies that 
0 > t s   and  thus  i j i i ¹ .  The  positive  risk  premium  in  MS  and  AC  would  likely  drive  up  the 
domestic interest rate somewhat relative to the foreign interest rate level thereby providing some 
cushion against (or mitigation of) the effects we described in the preceding section. Such a cushion 
is also likely to play a role in economies with flexible exchange regimes, while in these economies 
the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate will clearly provide additional leeway for monetary   23 
policy: in this case  0 ) ( 1 ¹ W D + t t e E  so that the domestic and foreign interest rate can be set more 
independently. 
However, the monetary integration process that MS and AC are or are intended to engage in 
may in both cases render such cushion less effective, in particular as countries are getting closer to 
qualifying for euro area entry.  Beside the obligation of the exchange rate stabilization within the 
ERM II system prior to the euro area entry, the process of nominal convergence and in particular 
the  convergence  play  –  i.e.  foreign  buying  of  MS  and  AC  assets  in  the  expectation  of  their 
revaluation (in foreign-currency terms) through the combination of interest rate convergence and, 
possibly, an appreciation of MS and AC currencies – may play an important role in this respect. To 
see this consider a deliberately very simple model of the convergence play that focuses on the 
aspect of interest rate convergence:  
) )( 1 ( ) ( j t i t
c
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where, 
c
j i  is the convergence-play-induced interest rate, i.e. the domestic interest rate targeted by 
financial markets during the period of the convergence play,  j i denotes the non-convergence play 
interest rate, i.e. the (unobservable) interest rate that would prevail on the domestic market if there 
was no convergence play, and  i i  denotes the euro area interest rate (the ECB rate), a  is the weight 
assigned by investors to the euro area rate, 
_
t  denotes the date at which the domestic authorities 
announce their target date for euro area entry, and T , is the euro area entry date.    24 
This  simple  model  implies  that  once  the  perspective  of  euro  area  entry  arises  and,  in 
particular, once it becomes more concrete through the announcement of a credible entry target 
date,
10 forward looking investors will start calculating the domestic nominal interest rate, 
c
j i , as a 
weighted average of  j i  and the interest rate that will prevail after joining the euro area,  i i , i.e. the 
euro area or the ECB short-term nominal interest rate target. Moreover, the weight of the euro area 
rate assigned by investors in their calculations of the domestic rate will be increasing with the date 
of the euro adoption approaching, hence  ) (t f = a  and  ) , ( , 0 ) ( '
_
T t t t f Î " > . At the time of the 
euro area entry, the ECB will take over the monetary policy conduct in new euro area member and 
hence  ) , 1 T t > = a . 
Notwithstanding  the  simplicity  of  the  approach,  the  presented  framework  implies  that a 
country striving to join the euro area may face an exogenous fall in the interest rate, i.e. the cost of 
credit that may add momentum to credit dynamics in that country. In fact, with forward looking 
investors the domestic interest rate will be converging close to the euro area level already before the 
final entry date, the T day. In the extreme case, a country may ultimately experience difficulties in 
fulfilling the entry requirements for the euro area, unless the effects of the nominal convergence 
(play) are counter-balanced by other policies.     
 
4.3 Is there reason for concern? 
Is  such  credit  expansion  an  essentially  benign  process  that  reflects  the  shift  to  a  new 
equilibrium or do we see an excessive increase of private sector debt that will eventually require 
some correction? If it is the former, should policy-makers let the adjustment to the new equilibrium 
                                                 
10 Of course, the announcement of the target entry date per se is not a sufficient condition for the convergence play to 
kick in. Clearly, in order to produce the effects discussed above such announcement should be backed up by policies 
that are conducive to the future adoption of the euro. Otherwise, the announcement will not be credible enough to start 
the process of convergence play.      25 
work itself through the system, or should they take policy measures to slow rapid credit growth so 
as to contain vulnerabilities, both as regards financial stability and macroeconomic balance? 
On the one hand one can see the lending boom as a natural consequence of the increase in 
trend  productivity  growth  rate.  In  terms  of  the  model  presented  in  section  3,  it  is  an  optimal 
response of the representative household. In this case the boom would not necessarily imply any 
future bust along the way. After all the country’s productivity rises and the household can afford to 
borrow. Furthermore, rising indebtedness of the country can be simply a reflection of financial and 
goods market integration as the integration process unfolds. As Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) 
show, this would lead to a higher equilibrium level of indebtedness. On the other hand, as is known 
from  overlapping  generation  models,  even  if  individual  intertemporal  decisions  are  privately 
optimal, they can lead to inefficient aggregate outcomes, in particular if an economy is not perfectly 
open
11.  Furthermore,  the  benchmark  intertemporal  models,  including  the  NNS  model,  typically 
assume perfect foresight. However, if borrowing decisions are in practice based on overly bullish 
expectations about future income, lending expansions may eventually become unsustainable and 
would imply correction. This may be relevant especially in cases where a constrained monetary 
policy  cannot  respond  to  a  credit  boom  and  other  polices  fail  to  sufficiently  do  so  either.  In 
particular, if the credit boom is not properly kept in check by relevant policies and leads, through 
the increased aggregate demand, to added inflation pressures, asset prices inflation or unsustainable 
current account deficits, the situation may become problematic. For example, the excessive asset 
price inflation may lead to potential misallocation of resources and thus render the household’s 
optimistic  expectations  about  future  income  incorrect.  Large  external  imbalances  that  exceed 
sustainable levels for a prolonged period of time may too pose risk to macroeconomic stability, 
especially  if  they  contribute  to  changing  market  sentiment.  A  pick  up  in  inflation  may  pose 
additional challenges for policy making. 
                                                 
11 See for a discussion of this point in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002).   26 
  Overall, while credit growth is in general a welcome development as it leads to financial 
deepening which may eventually support GDP growth in the long-run, there are a number of policy 
issues that arise in the process and authorities need to remain vigilant. In the next section we present 
supplementary discussion in this context. 
 
5.  Discussion of policy implications for MS and AC  
The NNS model presented in section 3 and the more detailed discussion of the model in 
section 4 highlight the role of monetary policy and interest rates for the dynamics of credit in an 
economy. Recent studies on the factors driving credit growth in new MS and AC corroborate that 
falling interest rates certainly are a key factor that has spurred credit growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe (see e.g. Backé and Zumer (2005)). Declining interest rates in the region are a consequence 
of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  of  financial  sector  reforms.  Banking  sectors  have  been 
rehabilitated  and  privatized  (mostly  to  financial  institutions  with  headquarters  in  the  old  EU 
Member States), and competition has greatly increased. In fact, in many countries in the region, 
foreign banks have aimed at raising market shares, which has further compressed interest rates, in 
particular on the lending side. Overall, the provision of financial services and the access of the 
corporate and household sector to finance have greatly improved, while at the same time its costs 
have substantially fallen. Moreover, successful transformation and the increased integration of new 
MS and AC in the European Union and international division of labor has raised expectations of 
faster  income  growth  in  the  future.  Such  a  setting,  in  which  countries  emerge  from  financial 
repression and perceptions about future growth increase, is certainly conducive to dynamic financial 
deepening and, in particular, fast credit growth.  
The framework presented in this paper takes the issue a step further. It shows that credible 
hard peg regimes may well add a further element of stimulus to credit growth, if potential output 
and productivity growth rates in the pegging country are higher than in the anchor country/area.   27 
This extra stimulus will lead to higher output and inflation volatility and can, in the worst case, 
result in – potentially very costly – boom-bust cycles, unless other policy areas help offset the 
impact  of  low  or  negative  real  interest  rates  on  aggregate  demand  developments.  The  policy 
implication for countries with hard peg regimes is to be particularly prudent as regards fiscal policy, 
banking sector supervision, as well as the smooth functioning of product and labor markets (see e.g. 
Lipschitz, Lane and Mourmouras (2005)). 
Some first empirical findings support the proposition that credit growth in hard peg countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe has been more dynamic than in the other countries of the region, in 
the sense that private sector credit/GDP levels the former group of countries (with the exception of 
Lithuania) have been converging more quickly to their estimated equilibrium levels than this has 
been the case for countries with more flexible exchange rate policies (see Backé, Égert and Zumer 
(2006)). 
In fact, the interpretation of the NNS model can be generalized to all cases in which a central 
bank is effectively constrained in using the interest rate as a policy tool. Such constraints may not 
only emanate from explicit exchange rate commitments. They may also result from a range of other 
factors,  e.g.  a  limited  effectiveness  in  the  interest  rate  channel  of  monetary  transmission, 
asymmetries in the exchange rate pass-through, global liquidity conditions and discontinuities in 
risk premiums and, as we argued in the previous section, the process of interest rate convergence. 
The effectiveness of the interest rate channel, in turn, is related to financial depth (which is 
still comparatively low in some new MS and AC despite the recent credit boom), to the degree of 
currency substitution in the financial sector (which is high in a number of MS and AC), and to 
banks’ business strategies (the quest for market share has apparently diluted the transmission from 
money market rates into lending rates in various new MS and AC). 
Moreover, in countries with a high degree of currency substitution, monetary policy is more 
generally constrained, as sizeable changes in exchange rates could have large balance sheet and   28 
wealth effects (“fear of floating”). On the other hand, a flexible exchange rate may reduce the 
incentives of economic agents to incur currency mismatches in the first place. However, this does 
not necessarily hold true if agents expect a nominal trend appreciation of their home currencies 
against foreign currencies (which does seem to be a relatively wide-spread expectation in new MS 
and AC with more flexible exchange rate policies). 
Of  course,  once  the  credibility  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  is  shattered,  financial 
stability is also at peril in pegging countries, in particular if domestic agents have built up sizeable 
amounts of unhedged foreign-currency debt in the expectation of a stable nominal exchange rate to 
the anchor currency.  
The  pass-through  of  exchange  rate  movements  to  inflation  may  be  faster  and  more 
pronounced in case of depreciation than it is in the case of appreciation (see Popa 2006). This 
constrains interest rate policy, as the interest rate needed to ensure macroeconomic balance may 
lead  to  an  overshooting  of  exchange  rate  appreciation.  If  the  exchange  rate  pass-through  is 
asymmetric, the subsequent exchange rate correction would have a ratcheting-up effect on inflation. 
Global liquidity conditions and discontinuities in the pricing of risk can also infringe on the 
scope of monetary policy in small open economies. This is particularly so for periods of low interest 
rates  in  the  world’s  large  economies  which  are  often  paired  with  increases  in  risk  appetite  of 
international financial investors (search for higher yields). In such settings, large capital inflows 
would  thwart  any  attempt  by  a  central  bank  to  keep  interest  rates  at  levels  that  would  ensure 
macroeconomic balance in catching-up economies, no matter what monetary strategy it follows. 
Nevertheless,  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  should  allow  at  least  provide  for  some 
additional margin of maneuver in affecting the monetary stance, given the currency risk premium 
such a regime involves, even if this risk is substantially under-priced at times.  
Finally, it should be pointed out that the NNS model presented in this paper does not take 
into account the potential costs and effects of exchange rate regime changes. Shifting from a well-  29 
established fixed peg to a more flexible regime may in itself impinge on the credibility of monetary 
policy and the preparations of a country for monetary integration. It is an open question whether the 
gains from a degree of monetary autonomy – more precisely, temporary monetary autonomy before 
the eventual joining of monetary union – would outweigh these potential costs. 
 
5. 6. Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  proposed  a  conceptual  framework  to  understand  the  nature  and 
consequences of the recent surge of credit lending, in particular household lending, in new Member 
States and Acceding Countries. We concentrated on the consumption smoothing as an important 
channel  for  the  observed  phenomenon  and  we  analyzed  its  relation  to  and  its  effects  on  the 
monetary policy making. Based on our analysis we discussed some policy implications for MS and 
AS in the context of their prospective monetary integration with the euro area. 
We  have  shown,  in  the  context  of  an  optimizing  model,  how  productivity  shocks  may 
produce credit booms through their effects on the consumption smoothing behavior of economic 
agents. Furthermore, we have demonstrated how the constraint on monetary policy deriving from an 
exchange rate commitment can add extra momentum to lending dynamics in small, catching-up 
economies such as MS and AC, in particular as they are getting closer to qualifying for euro area 
entry. In doing so, we have emphasized the effects of the convergence play at the threshold of euro 
adoption. 
Although  we  have  not  formally  modeled  them  in  our  paper,  our  results  highlight  the 
importance  of  other  policies,  such  as  fiscal  policies  and  financial  market  prudential  regulation 
policies, in keeping credit growth in  check. This seems particularly important for the new EU 
Member  States  and  the  Acceding  Countries  which  are  destined  to  participate  in  the  euro  area 
alongside with the prospect of a potentially fast catching-up process and a need for further financial 
deepening of their economies. The link between these policies and monetary policy in catching-up   30 
countries  would  thus  appear  to  be  an  important  subject  for  further  research  possibly  using  the 
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Appendix 
 
The New Neoclassical Synthesis Approach: Household and Firm Behaviour. 
In  this  appendix  we  present  the  derivation  of  the  key  household  and  firm  equilibrium 
conditions contained in the text. Since the model is symmetric with respect to the home and foreign 
country we focus here only on the household and firm in country i.  
 
Household consumption 
Each  country  contains  a  representative  household  which  maximizes  lifetime  utility, 
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where  ) ( 1
i C U  represent utility from consumption in the present period,  ) ( 2
i C U  is utility from future 
consumption,  i r  is a fixed preference parameter, the subjective discount or time-preference factors 
and  ) , ( 2 1
i i i C C U  is therefore the present discounted values of lifetime utility from consumption. The 
parameters  are  positive,  and  measure  consumers’  impatience  to  consume.  In  other  words, 
consumers favor current consumption over future consumption. As usual, we assume that the period 
utility function  ) (C U  is strictly increasing in consumption and strictly concave:  0 ) `( > C U  and 
0 ) ``( < C U . 
The lifetime budget constraint of each household is given by:   
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+   is  the  present  discounted  value  of  lifetime  income  prospects  of  a  representative 
household from the country i , and  ) 1 ( i r +  represents the “marginal rate of transformation” of future 
for  current  consumption.  Equation  (A2)  says  that  the  household’s  lifetime  consumption  cannot 
exceed their lifetime income.  
Assuming  the  utility  function  has  a  log  form,  c C U log ) ( = ,  so  that  c C U / 1 ) ´( = ,  each 
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Equation A3) says that the household values current consumption more highly relative to 
future consumption the more abundant is planned future consumption compared to planned current 
consumption. 
The  households´  utility  from  lifetime  consumption  is  maximized,  i.e.  the  optimal 
consumption plan is obtained, when the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation: 
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Household Labor supply  
Each household’s time budget supply is given by: 
1 = + i i n l ,                       A5) 
where, l is time allocated to leisure and n is time allocated to work by each household; the amount 
of time per period is normalized to 1. A household gets direct utility from leisure and indirectly by 
earning a wage and using the wage to buy consumption goods
12.  
Assuming log utility functions for leisure and consumption, the allocation of time in a given 
period which maximizes the household’s utility is that where the marginal utility earned directly 








.                      A6) 
Given A5) and A6), household’s willingness to supply labor is a function of household 
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Firms, Employment and Output 
In each country there are a large number of monopolistically competitive firms; i.e. each 
firm is large in its market but small with respect to the whole economy. Firms can sustain a price 
above the marginal cost of production and adjust their prices to maintain the profit maximizing 
markup of price over marginal cost, * m , at all times. The profit maximizing markup is invariant to 
shifts in demand or in the cost of production. 
                                                 
12 The hourly wage buys w units of consumption and the household values the additional w units of consumption at 
u’(c)=1/c. So, the household earns w/c units of utility by working an hour instead of taking leisure.    34 
The production function has a standard Cobb-Douglas form: 
b b - =
1 k an y ,                      A8) 
where y denotes output, and a, n and k stand for productivity, labor and capital. For simplicity we 
assume constant returns to scale and constant capital stock. Furthermore, noting that total output is 
fully  consumed,  we  can  write  production  of  consumption  goods  c  in  each  country  as  being 
generated by using only labor input, n, according to the following, linear, production technology:  
i i i n a c = ,                         A9) 
where  i a  denotes labor productivity in units of consumption goods produced per hour in each 
country. Labor productivity fluctuates and grows over time with technological progress. 





= m ,                      A10) 
where P is the price of a unit of consumption goods, and MC is the marginal cost
13.   
Given that MC is equal to the nominal wage, W times (1/a) hours of work needed to produce 





= m ,                      A11) 
where w is the real wage (W/P).  
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where real wage grows and fluctuates directly with productivity 
 
Equilibrium  employment  in  each  country,  n*,  is  determined  by  using  A9)  and  A12)  to 
substitute for c and w in the labor supply function A8). From this we obtain the desired labor supply 









- = ,                    A13) 
and equate it to labor utilized by each country’s firm n, ( n n
s = ), 
                                                 
13  Note,  although  this  is  not  crucial  for  the  end  results,  that  i P and  j P may  or  may  not  be  necessarily  equal  in 
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Equilibrium output c* in each country is determined from production technology A9) and 





= a ci ,                    A15) 
where output c* grows and fluctuates proportionally with productivity a. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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